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Introduction 
 
The current global demographic shift toward population aging, largely reflecting rising life 
expectancy and declining fertility (Munnell 2004) has led many countries across the world to 
re-evaluate their pension systems. Typically, they switch wholly or partially from unfunded 
systems, e.g. pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funded systems, with reform in Emerging Market 
Economies (EMEs) often supported by World Bank finance (Holzmann and Hinz 2005).  
 
Given the funded nature of many new pension schemes, pension fund assets have increased 
across many countries. Looking first at OECD countries, in 1980, UK pension assets were 
equivalent to 115.6 billion US dollars (21.5% of GDP), whereas in 2000 these two figures had 
increased to 1281.5 billion US dollars (79% of GDP) (OECD 2003). The trend was similar in 
most other OECD countries. Table 1 shows that as of 2000, total pension fund assets across our 
selected advanced OECD countries were US$12 trillion. The US as the biggest pension market 
accounted for just above half of the total with Japan and the UK following. In terms of pension 
assets relative to GDP, the Netherlands had the largest ratio at 149% of GDP, while this figure 
for New Zealand, at 0.69%, was the smallest across OECD countries. 
 
As regards data for EMEs shown in Table 2, Chile is the country which pioneered reform 
towards private funded pensions and its experience is often cited to justify funded pension 
reform; in that country pension funds grew from zero in 1980 to 60 per cent of GDP as of 2002. 
The biggest EME pension markets were, however, Singapore and Malaysia which adopted 
publicly managed funded Provident Fund pension systems in the 1950s. Other EMEs with 
significant pension assets include Brazil and Mexico. Total pension assets across our selected 
EME countries in 2002 were US$ 280 billion, while the average pension asset-GDP ratio was 
12 per cent, much less than that of OECD countries which was 42 per cent. 
 
Given demographic trends and the structure of funded schemes, it is virtually certain that 
pension funds will continue their rapid expansion during the coming decades. In this context, a 
key issue in pension reform is whether such a shift from PAYG to funding is largely a matter 
of reallocation of the financial burden of ageing (with the risk of a generation paying twice), or 
whether funding improves economic performance sufficiently to generate at least some of the 
additional resources required to meet the needs of an ageing population. There are several 
aspects to this question. One is whether funding leads to an increase in saving which permits 
higher capital formation. A second is whether, independently of the impact on saving, there are 
favourable effects of funding on the functioning of capital and labour markets, for example via 
acceleration of financial development, generating in turn a more efficient allocation of capital. 
A third is whether, following from these effects, a direct impact of funding on growth can be 
discerned. 
 
Whereas there is quite extensive work on funding’s effect on saving and on financial 
development (Hu (2005a), Davis and Hu (2005), Davis (2005)), the direct role of pension 
funds in economic growth has been little examined. Is pension-fund growth positively 
associated with economic performance? And if so, how long will this positive impact 
continue? In this paper, we seek to provide insight into these questions with both a theoretical 
model and related empirical work for most OECD countries and selected EMEs. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief literature review on the issue of 
whether and how pension fund growth may impact on economic performance. Section 2 deals 
with the model specification, which is derived from the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
and views pension fund assets as a shift factor, an idea developed from McCoskey and Kao 
(1999) and Arestis et al (2004). Data and variables are discussed in Section 3. In Sections 4, we 
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test our data’s stationarity by using unit root tests and find variables to be I(1), implying a need 
to allow for cointegration. In Section 5, our first econometric work is conducted with the help 
of cointegrating dynamic OLS (DOLS) model, which we consider most appropriate for the 
question in hand. Complementing this, in Section 6, we follow the dynamic heterogeneous 
estimation procedures designed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) to look at the average long run 
relations and allow for cross country heterogeneity. In Section 7, we move to 
country-by-country co-integration tests, investigating whether there is a long run relationship 
between pension funds and economic growth and again allowing again for cross country 
heterogeneity. Impulse responses of output per capita to pension assets in the related Vector 
Error Correction Models (VECM) are calculated as well as variance decompositions. In each 
case we assess results with and without a time trend, which may capture other influences on the 
production relation such as structural reform. 
 
Summarising the results (see Table 11), a strong and positive relation is found in the 
cointegrating dynamic OLS panel model between pension assets, output and capital, with 
larger effects of pension assets on output for EMEs when a time trend is included. Panel 
cointegration coefficients using mean-group dynamic heterogeneous models again find a 
positive and significant average long run relationship between pension assets and output, again 
notably for emerging market economies. Country-by-country cointegration tests typically find 
a cointegrating relationship between the I(1) variables pension assets/GDP, the capital stock 
per capita and output per capita. Impulse responses in the related VECM with and without the 
trend show that a rise in pension assets typically boosts output per worker, and during a 
25-year period, the effect typically remains positive. Significantly larger effects are found for 
EMEs than OECD countries. 
 
1. Literature review 
 
Whereas there is some evidence of a small positive effect of pension-funding on household 
saving (Kohl and O’Brien 1998), the relevant variable for economic growth is national saving 
which largely determines investment1, as would be predicted by a standard Solow (2000) 
growth model. James (1998) argues that one main advantage of World Bank multi-pillar model 
of pension reform is that national saving as well as personal saving could be boosted. But any 
positive effect of pension fund growth on personal saving could be offset at the level of 
national saving by the impact on public finances of the costs involved in the transition to a 
privately funded system (Holzmann 1997), as well as the costs of tax subsidies to personal 
saving. A key aspect of this issue is hence how pension-reforming governments finance 
existing social security obligations. If the government tries to finance the implicit pension 
debts by public debts, then public savings would decrease, so the overall national saving rate 
might be unchanged or even fall.  
 
There is conflicting empirical evidence on this point. Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) estimated that 
pension reform in Chile raised the national saving rate. Given the difficulty of pinning down 
how the pension reform was financed in Chile, he considered three cases, i.e. fiscal 
contraction-based financing of pension reform at the levels of 100%, 75% and 50%. On 
balance, he suggests that between 10% and 45% of the rise in national saving could be 
explained by pension reform, with the remaining being explained by structural reform, e.g. tax 
reform etc. Lopez-Murphy and Musalem (2004) study 50 countries and find that national 
saving is boosted where pension funds are the result of a mandatory pension programme, but 
not when they are voluntary. On the other hand, Samwick (1999), working with a panel of 
                                                        
1 Whereas such relations can be weakened by international capital flows, the extensive literature on the 
“Feldstein-Horioka puzzle” shows that domestic investment continues to be strongly related to domestic (i.e. 
national) saving. 
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countries, found that no countries except Chile experienced an increase in gross national 
saving rates after pension reform towards non-PAYG systems. He included control variables 
such as the log of per capita income, per capita income growth, the private credit to income 
ratio, demographic indicators and the urbanisation rate to avoid omitted variables bias. 
Furthermore, Bosworth and Burtless (2004) found that OECD countries that seek to prefund 
social security obligations such as Japan and the US incur offsetting increases in government 
borrowing that again offset any difference in national saving. 
 
Given the doubt about a link of pension reform to national saving, we consider it important to 
focus on some alternative channels for pensions to affect growth, via improved economic 
efficiency and resource allocation. The link between pension funds and capital market 
development has been widely analysed in the recent literature, as reviewed in Davis and Hu 
(2005). Both prices and quantities of long term financing may be favourably affected, which 
may in turn raise productive investment and improve resource allocation. 
 
Focusing on emerging market economies (EMEs), Walker and Lefort (2002) argue that 
pension funds can decrease the cost of capital via three channels. The first channel is more 
developed capital market resulting from pension reforms, thus making the issuing of securities 
cheaper. Secondly, even allowing for short-term performance evaluation (Davis and Steil 
2001), the expected investment time horizon of pension funds is longer than that of individuals 
and firms, thus reducing the ‘term premium’. Third, the equity risk premium is reduced due to 
pension funds’ pooling and professional management. Both the term premium and risk 
premium’s reduction might lead to a decrease in the average cost of capital, which spurs 
investment. In addition, they give some evidence that pension funds reduce security price 
volatility, implying a lower risk premium for their panel of emerging market economies, 
although an opposite result is found by Davis (2004) for G-7 countries. Turning from prices to 
quantities, Catalan et al (2000) give evidence that contractual saving institutions, e.g. pension 
funds, positively Granger-cause equity market capitalisation as well as value traded, while 
Impavido et al (2003) and Hu (2005a) find a positive relationship between contractual saving 
assets and bond market capitalisation/GDP.  
 
In sum, the current literature suggests a positive relation between pension fund growth and 
financial development, see also the survey in Davis (2005). Given it is widely considered that 
financial development is positively associated with economic growth (Levine and Zervos 
1998; Beck and Levine 2004), then pension funds might enhance economic growth via their 
impact on financial development, independently of an effect on national saving. 
 
Pension funds may also boost economic growth via improved corporate governance (Clark and 
Hebb 2003; Myners 2001)2. Clark and Hebb (2003) identify four drivers which facilitate 
pension funds’ corporate engagement, which they see as foreshadowing the so-called “Fifth 
Stage of Capitalism”. The first driver is the widespread use of indexation techniques in the 
pension funds industry, which hinders “exit” via sale of shares in underperforming companies 
which are in the index. The second driver is the increasing demand by owners for more 
transparency and accountability, particularly after the Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat 
scandals. Third, there is pension funds’ pressure to undertake socially responsible investing 
(SRI). Fourth, pressures to “humanize” capital with social, moral and political objectives 
extend pension funds’ simple concerns for rate of return.  
 
A positive impact of pension fund activism on corporate performance at the firm level is well 
                                                        
2 The effectiveness of pension funds’ positive impact on corporate governance has been challenged by Orszag 
(2002) and empirical works in the US such as Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999).  
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documented, although empirical work is largely focused on the US3. But our concern in this 
paper is whether pension fund growth is a potential engine of economic growth via its effect on 
corporate performance at the macro level, an issue which is ignored or dismissed by most 
current pensions research. An exception is Davis (2002, 2004) who argues that complementary 
studies at the macro level are needed, because effects of governance initiatives from 
institutional investors may go wider than the “target firms” to the whole economy. This is 
because unaffected firms have natural incentives to improve their performance so as to avoid 
the threat from pension fund activism in the future (Marsh 1990). Therefore, if a significant 
proportion of firms, whether directly affected and indirectly affected by pension fund activism, 
tend to improve their performance, the overall effect might be higher economic growth and 
productivity for the whole economy. Consistent with this, Davis found inter alia that 
institutional holding of equity is related to a boost to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and in R 
and D. 
 
Besides the issue of corporate governance, labour market performance is relevant. It is well 
known that due to the weak link between pension contributions and benefits under 
defined-benefit PAYG systems, there is a tendency towards earlier retirement and job 
immobility. For example, over the postwar period, there was a very sharp fall in participation 
rates for those men over state pension age (65+) in EU countries (Disney 2002). One 
contributing factor was the disincentives imbedded in public pension systems (Blondal and 
Scarpetta 1998). In addition to the pension system’s impact on labour supply, Disney (2003) 
argues that the distortionary “tax component” of public pension contributions can also affect 
labour demand if the employee can pass through the burden of pension contribution to 
consumers for example via product prices, because product demand falls and producers might 
consider reducing the demand for labour. In view of such problems, James (1998) suggests that 
“the close linkage between benefits and contributions, in a defined-contribution plan is 
designed to reduce labour market distortions.” In consequence, economic growth might be 
increased, e.g. due to a higher labour participation rate after pension reform. Such effects might 
be smaller where defined benefit funded schemes predominate. 
 
Looking at the direct link of growth to pension reform, most extant studies have focused on 
Chile. Holzmann (1997) found a positive relationship between pension reform and economic 
growth. With the simple Solow residual specification of TFP, it was found that improving 
financial market conditions following the pension reform significantly positively affected TFP. 
But this model suffers from low “t” values which might result from multicollinearity between 
independent variables, e.g. the unemployment rate and stock market index. Meanwhile, 
Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) reached the conclusion that pension reform in Chile boosted private 
investment, the average productivity of capital and TFP. One single regression was estimated 
to obtain the coefficients of parameters, then these coefficients are used to calculate the rise of 
each variable attributed respectively to structural reform, (e.g. tax reform) and pension reform. 
In all, he concluded that pension reform in Chile had a positive impact on the private 
investment rate, average productivity of capital and the TFP growth rate. For example, pension 
reform contributed to 0.1-0.4 per cent of the 1.5 per cent increase in TFP growth rate, while 
0.4–1.5 per cent of the total 13 per cent rise in private investment rate was attributed to pension 
reforms with the remainder being explained by structural reform.  
 
Empirical work which investigates the direct link between pension fund growth and economic 
growth at a transnational level is quite scarce to our knowledge, although Davis (2002 and 
2004) with a dataset covering both pension funds and life insurance companies, looked at the 
relation between institutionalisation and economic performance at the macro level. Although 
                                                        
3 See Wahal (1996), Smith (1996), and more recent work by Woikdtke (2002) and Coronado et al (2003) for 
estimates of the impact of pension activism on corporate performance at the firm level.  
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his results are, as noted, consistent with higher TFP, he finds no direct effect of the proportion 
of equity held by life insurers and pension funds on GDP growth. Again, Davis (2004) using a 
dataset of 16 OECD countries and a standard Levine-Zervos (1998) specification for finance 
and growth does not find a positive direct link between institutionalisation (life insurance and 
pension assets/GDP) and growth per se. 
 
On the other hand, using the technique developed by Hurlin and Venet (2003) and Hurlin 
(2005), Hu (2005b) shows that Panel Granger Causality tests do indicate homogeneous 
causality from pension assets to GDP growth in 38 countries as well as in the subgroups OECD 
(18 countries) and EMEs (19 countries). Reverse causality is weaker, and notably for emerging 
markets there is no strong evidence that GDP growth homogenously causes pension assets. 
 
Taking into account the above literature review, this paper seeks to contribute to the current 
growth and pensions literature in three areas. First, we design a modified Cobb-Douglas 
production function with the inclusion of pension assets as a shift factor. Second, we employ a 
set of different econometric methods to test the model on data for up to 38 countries, which 
includes a cointegrating dynamic OLS estimator for the main panel results and also the 
dynamic heterogeneous models designed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) to look at the average 
long run relations between variables, allowing for cross country heterogeneity. Third we 
directly link pension assets to economic growth in a co-integration relationship on a 
country-by-country basis and investigate the extent to which they are correlated in the long run 
as well as the impulse responses and variance decomposition in the related 
Vector-Error-Correction Model. 
 
2. Model specification 
 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in the economic literature: 
 
1Q AK Lβ β−=                                           (1) 
 
where A is technology, K is the capital stock and L is the labour force. Generally, the 
Cobb-Douglas function is specified as shown in Equation (1). But in this study, we modify the 
function slightly so as to facilitate our analysis of the implication of pension fund assets for 
output Q. In addition, in view of our panel analysis, we use a double subscript on its variables.  
 
1
, , , , ,( ) ( ) ( )i i ii t i t i t i t i tQ A P K L
λ β β−
= × × ×                                (2) 
 
where: i: time series dimension; 
t: cross section dimension; 
Q: aggregate output, proxied by GDP; 
A: state of technology; 
P: pension funds, proxied by pension fund assets/GDP; 
K: capital stock4; 
L: labour supply, proxied by total population; 
λ : elasticity of aggregate output with respect to pension fund assets; 
β : elasticity of aggregate output with respect to the capital stock.  
 
Equation (2) suggests that aggregate output is affected both by technology A and pension fund 
assets P, which act as shift factors, as well as capital K and labour L. Note that the model does 
                                                        
4 Capital stock is calculated based on the perpetual inventory method. Consistent with Luintel and Khan (1999), 
we used 8 per cent of depreciation rate and averaged first 3-year growth rate to obtain the initial capital stock.  
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not assume pension fund growth raises saving – trends in national saving will be captured by 
the capital stock variable, to the extent external balance is maintained. In effect, we test 
whether owing to better resource allocation, incentives etc., pension fund growth makes the 
capital stock more productive. Arestis et al (2004) and McCoskey and Kao (1999), among 
others, use the similar specification, i.e. a generalised Cobb-Douglas production function with 
relevant additional variables such as urbanization rates or the nature of the financial system set 
as shift factors into the standard function. Technology may then be specified as follows: 
 
,
,
i i i tt
i tA e
α γ ε+ +
=                                               (3) 
 
This specification is in line with McCoskey and Kao (1999), where α is the intercept, t  is the 
time trend and ε  is the residual term. Specifying the state of technology in this way assigns 
each of our country sample with the country-specific intercept and time trend (allowing for 
heterogeneity across countries that might relate to factors such as structural reform) and also 
introduces a stochastic element, i.e.ε  into the model as indicated in Equation (5) below. 
Replacing technology A in Equation (2) by its expression in terms of t as shown in Equation (3) 
gives  
 
, 1
, , , ,( ) ( )i i i t i i i
t
i t i t i t i tQ e P K L
α γ ε λ β β+ + −
= × × ×                             (4) 
 
Then, normalising by ,i tL  and taking logs from both sides in Equation 4, we have  
 
,, ,
,
, ,
( ) ( )i i i t i iti t i ti t
i t i t
Q K
e P
L L
α γ ε λ β+ +
= × ×  
,* *
, , ,( ) ( )i i i t i i
t
i t i t i tQ e P K
α γ ε λ β+ +
= × ×  
                 * *, , , ,i t i i i i t i i t i tLnQ t LnP LnKα γ λ β ε= + + + +             (5) 
where , ,* *, ,
, ,
i t i t
i t i t
i t i t
Q K
Q and K
L L
= =  
iiiiii and 321 , ωφβωλλωλγ +=+=+=  
 
*
,i tQ  is output per worker and 
*
,i tK  is capital per worker. The model shown in Equation (5) is 
the standard formulation of Swamy’s Random Coefficient Model (RCM) (Swamy and Tavlas 
1995) where we can allow for heterogeneity across countries in terms of time (t), pension fund 
assets (LnP) and capital per worker (LnK). We view this model as appropriate in that pension 
fund assets’ impact on output might show marked differentials across countries. 
 
Following the model above, we regress capital per worker (CPW) and pension fund 
assets/GDP (PFAGDP), which are K* and P in Equation 5 respectively, on output per worker 
(OPW) or Q*, using various econometric techniques. We estimate with and without the time 
trend (t) which may capture other influences on production relations such as structural reforms. 
 
Following Arestis et al (2004) we do not include some of the standard variables typically 
entered in cross-sectional cross country growth regressions such as years of schooling, as well 
as corruption, social capital, inequality and rule of law. On the one hand, it would not have 
been feasible to build an annual time series for these variables. Furthermore, we consider that a 
generalized production function estimated is the appropriate specification for the issue in hand 
and using panel data with fixed effects and a time trend (in some specifications) will capture 
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any relevant differences in growth performance across countries. 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
Before describing estimation, we outline issues in data construction and unit root tests. 
Regarding the calculations of Q* and K* we use standard macro-economic data from the 
World Development Indicators 2003 (WDI) database. The capital stock is derived by the 
perpetual inventory method. Consistent with Luintel and Khan (1999), we used an 8 per cent 
depreciation rate and averaged the first 3-year growth rate to obtain the initial capital stock. 
 
Pension fund asset data were collected from a variety of sources. For OECD countries, OECD 
(2003) and Davis and Steil (2001) are the main sources, but some are expanded and updated by 
checking financial statistical reports in individual countries, e.g. National Financial Statistics 
for the UK data and Institute of Pension Research and Nikko Financial Intelligence, Inc for the 
Japan data. For Latin American countries, the website of Federación Internacional de 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (FIAP) (International Federation of Pension Fund 
Administrations) in Chile provides pension data up to the year end of 2003 on many Latin 
American countries. For South Asian countries and South Africa, pension data are largely 
compiled individually by searching local central banks’ Financial Bulletins, although ASEAN 
Social Security Association’s website was used to update recent pension data on some 
Southeast Asian countries.  
 
Regarding the data observation period, in general, for capital per worker and output per worker 
we have data for years between 1960 and 2002. But pension data are an exception. For OECD 
countries, e.g. the UK, the US, we have data ranging from 1960s to 2002, while for many 
EMEs, e.g. Brazil, the data available are relatively limited. See Appendix 1 for details of the 
variables across our 38 countries. 
 
4. Panel unit root test  
 
Before proceeding to formal panel regression analysis, the first step is to examine our data’s 
stationarity. 
 
4.1 Specification of tests 
 
There are a number of ways to test panel data’s stationarity (Maddala and Wu 1999; Baltagi 
2001). In this study, in order to check our results’ robustness, we use three different but 
commonly quoted tests, i.e. one designed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (hereafter LLC), one 
by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (hereafter IPS), and last one by Hadri (2000).  
 
Consider the following model 
 
, , 1 , , 1,... : 1,...i t i i t i t i i ty y X i N t Tρ δ ε−= + + = =                            (6) 
 
where y is our variable of interest; X is a vector of exogenous variables, including fixed effects 
and/or a time trend, or simply a constant, based on the modelers’ assumptions. ,i tε  are 
i.i.d. 2(0, )εσ . As customary, t proxies time, while i proxies country. 
 
The principal difference between LLC and IPS is the assumption made on iρ . LLC proposes 
that iρ = ρ , implying the coefficient of lagged dependent variable in Equation (6) is the same 
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across countries, while under IPS, iρ  is allowed to vary across countries. Given that in our 
sample, both OECD countries and EMEs are included, we put more emphasis on the latter test, 
i.e. IPS (2003), in that there might be heterogeneity across countries. 
 
Both LLC and IPS tests are an extended version of time series’ Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(ADF) into the context of panel data. The formulation is as follows: 
 
, , 1 , , , ,
1
1,... : 1,...
ip
i t i t i j i t j i t i i t
j
y y y X i N t Tβ ρ δ ε
− −
=
∆ = + ∆ + + = =∑              (7) 
 
LLC tests the null hypothesis of β =0, while IPS is testing that of iβ =0 for all i. In addition, for 
the IPS test, t-bar statistics is used, which are formed as a simple average of the individual t 
statistics for testing iβ =0 in Equation 7, namely 
 
∑
=
−
=−
N
i
iTNT tNbart
1
1                                        (8) 
 
Both LLC and IPS are commonly used in the current empirical literature for panel data. It has 
been argued, however, that they both suffer from the lack of power (Hadri 2000). In other 
words, the null hypothesis of a unit root tends to be accepted or not rejected unless there is 
strong evidence to the alternative, one form of type II error (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; 
Greene 2003). Therefore, it is suggested to test a null of stationarity as well as a null of a unit 
root. One well-known test for the null of no unit root is that proposed by Hadri (2000). Hadri 
testing is a residual based Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. Consider the model,  
 
, , ,i t i t i i ty r tβ ε= + +                                     (9) 
 
where , , 1 ,i t i t i tr r µ−= + , a random walk. The LM statistic is formulated as follows: 
 
2
,2 1
2
1 1N T
i ti t
S
N TLM
εσ
=
∧
=
∑ ∑
                             (10) 
 
where ,,
1
t
i ji t
j
S ε
∧
=
=∑  and 
2 2
,
1 1
1 N T
i t
i tNT
εσ ε
∧ ∧
= =
= ∑∑  
 
,i jε
∧
 is the estimated residual from Equation (9), ,i tS  is the partial sum of residuals, while 
2
εσ
∧
 
is the estimate of the error variance. Hadri’s residual-based LM test for the null of stationarity 
is promising in that it increases the power of testing for the null of a unit root. One problem 
associated with Hadri (2000), however, that like LLC (2003), it assumes the homogeneity of 
coefficients of iρ = ρ  in Equation (6). As we mentioned earlier, in our study, we use a dataset 
covering both OECD countries and EMEs; therefore, an assumption that ρ  varies across 
sections might be more appropriate.  
 
4.2 Results for panel unit root tests 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the panel unit root tests. For the log of the pension assets to GDP 
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ratio (PFAGDP) our results, under all three testing approaches, are in favour of non-stationarity 
in levels, and stationarity in first differences, implying that PFAGDP is an I(1) variable. 
Regarding the log-levels of output per worker (OPW) and capital per worker (CPW), under 
IPS and LLC, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity could not be rejected for this panel of 38 
countries. But after first differencing, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity be accepted. This is consistent with our assumption that 
OPW and CPW are also I(1) series. 
 
By employing the Hadri (2000) test, however, we could reject the hypothesis of no unit root 
under both levels and first differences. After second differencing, OPW and CPW become 
stationary, as the null of stationarity could not be rejected. This is intriguing and implies that 
OPW and CPW are I(2) variables if only based on Hadri. But, it is worth noting again that 
Hadri (2000) assumes a common unit root process, which as we have motioned earlier is less 
relevant in this study. Therefore, together with other two testing procedures, we believe 
PFAGDP, CPW and OPW are all non-stationary and I(1) variables. 
 
5. Dynamic OLS estimation  
 
5.1 Econometric specification 
 
In this section, we seek to identify the relation between pension assets and output in the context 
of our theoretical model by using the dynamic OLS (DOLS) cointegrating panel estimator. In 
panel data, Kao (1999) finds that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is biased, in that 
the t-statistics diverge so the inference is not reliable. The fully modified OLS (FMOLS) 
estimator is argued to be able to correct such bias in certain cases. The FMOLS was first 
proposed by Philips and Hansen (1990), and extended to the context of heterogeneous panels 
by Pedroni (1997), and then developed further in Philips and Moon (1999). Based on the 
simulation results from the Monte Carlo experiments, Kao and Chiang (2000), however, prove 
that under both contexts of homogeneous and heterogeneous panels, dynamic OLS (DOLS) is 
superior to fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and other OLS estimators. The advantages of DOLS 
over FMOLS are no requirement for initial estimation and non-parametric correction5. The 
DOLS model, used in our paper and following Stock and Watson (1993) is as follows: 
 
, , , ,
n
i t i t i t i t
j n
Y X Xα β γ ε
=−
= + + ∆ +∑                                              (11) 
 
where i and t are country and time indices as conventional. ,i tY  is the dependent variable, i.e. 
log output per worker (OPW). ,i tX  is a vector of explanatory variables, i.e. log pension fund 
assets/GDP, and log capital per worker (CPW). ,i tX∆  is the first difference of ,i tX , thereby 
introducing dynamic structure into the equation. The coefficients of ,i tX  give the 
accumulative/total effects. In addition, the length of leads and lags for ,i tX∆  has to be defined. 
The inclusion of these nuisance parameters in Equation 11 means we can obtain coefficient 
estimates with satisfactory limiting distribution properties (Kao and Chiang 2000; Kao et al 
1999). As mentioned by Kao and Chiang, however, it is difficult to choose the optimal length 
of leads and lags, which is a major drawback of the DOLS estimator. But, the practice is to use 
1 and/or 2 leads and lags.  
                                                        
5 We also consider DOLS to be more appropriate than system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) of 
Arellano and Bover (1995), since GMM is most appropriate when N is large and T is small (Bond 2002). But in 
our dataset, neither is the case; for example, we only have data covering 38 countries, while observations range 
from 5 years to 35 years.  
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5.2 Empirical results 
 
Results are given in Tables 4a and 4b, where our main focus is on the sign, size and 
significance of the variable LPFAGDP, the log of the pension fund assets/GDP ratio, which 
indicates the shift in the production function. As noted above, it is arbitrary to choose the 
length of leads and lags in the DOLS model, but the practice is to use 1 or 2 leads/lags (Mark 
and Sul 2002, and Kao et al 1999). In this paper, in order to check the robustness of DOLS 
model as in Pelgrin et al (2002), we used both 1 lead/lag and 2 leads/lags. We split our dataset 
according to two dimensions, i.e. OECD/EMEs, and with trend/no trend.  
 
Use of a trend is consistent with McCoskey and Kao (1999) where they use a time trend to 
identify the potential beneficial effect of technological advances on growth over time, as well 
as structural reform not related to pensions. In addition, as we have noted earlier, the variable 
capital per worker (CPW) is not stationary even after first differencing based on Hadri test, 
which might be due to the presence of a deterministic trend. Therefore, the specification with a 
trend utilised here might be able to deal with this issue. In order to allow for our data to have a 
deterministic trend as well as to allow for the potential effect of technological advances, we 
specified a model with a trend as well as without both in this section and for the Mean-Group 
and Johansen results reported below.. 
 
As regards the coefficient of LPFAGDP, in Table 4a where we used 1 lead/lag of the dynamic 
terms, five out of six estimates are significant and positive as expected, covering all three 
country groups. In Table 4b where we used 2 leads/lags, results are similar. In each case, for the 
All-countries estimation, the estimate without the trend is positive and statistically significant, 
while the estimate with the trend is insignificant, suggesting heterogeneity, which is manifest 
when the time trend is included. All the EME and OECD estimates are positive and significant. 
Meanwhile, the time trend term tends to be positive and significant under all cases. It implies 
that technological advances and structural reforms over time improve the relation of capital 
and labour to output. Its inclusion means the pension variable is not proxying an omitted trend. 
The estimates for LCPW are very satisfactory, in that all are statistically significant at 1 per 
cent, and positive at the range of 0.3-0.8. Finally, the adjusted R-square ratios are quite high in 
all cases. Note that differences in the size of the coefficients between the 1 and 2 lead/lag 
specification may relate largely to the difference in country composition, where the former 
uses data from 37 countries, the latter from 33. 
 
As regards the size of the LPFAGDP coefficients, they are in each case smaller when the time 
trend is included, implying that there are technical and structural changes that the trend is 
capturing, which is otherwise incorporated in the pension assets variable. But as noted, for 
OECD and EME groups and for each lag specification, the coefficients are significant and 
positive with the trend as well as without it. This parameter measures the total or cumulative 
effect of pension assets on output. Therefore, it implies that a one percent increase in 
LPFAGDP raises LOPW by a minimum 0.012 per cent under the case of OECD-with trend, 
and a maximum 0.068 per cent under the OECD-no trend as in Table 4b. Comparing the OECD 
and EME results, the OECD pension variable tends to be larger when the trend is omitted but 
smaller than in EMEs when the trend is included, where the latter results are more plausible. 
One would expect larger coefficients for EMEs, as is generally the case throughout our results, 
including the Mean-Group and Johansen regressions reported below. Such a finding is 
consistent with economic convergence theory (Sala-I-Martin 1996), i.e. poor countries are 
expected to grow faster than rich countries, as well as recent empirical results by Beck and 
Levine (2004) and Beck et al (2000) implying financial development is more beneficial to 
economic growth in EMEs. 
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The basic results are estimated by unbalanced-panel GLS with fixed effects and cross section 
weights. To check robustness, we sought to re-estimate with the Seemingly-Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) technique, which allows for correlations in the error terms. This was not 
feasible for the All or the EME group, because many of the observation series were too short. 
However, as shown in Tables 4a and 4b, it is apparent that for the OECD group, using SUR 
does not change the parameter estimates for LPFAGDP markedly, implying that our result of a 
clear “shift effect” in the production function from pension funding is a robust one. 
 
6. Dynamic heterogeneous models 
 
In view of the possibility that the impact of pension funds on economic growth may vary 
across countries, and also consistent with the suggestion of McCoskey and Kao (1999), we in 
this section seek to look further at the long run relationship by employing dynamic 
heterogeneous models. Pesaran and Smith (1995) present a number of different estimation 
procedures for estimating a dynamic panel data model across heterogeneous countries, namely 
the mean group estimator, aggregate time-series estimator, pooled mean group estimator and 
cross-section estimator. Due to other approaches’ limitations6 as well as data availability, we 
use only the mean group estimator in this section, investigating the average long run 
coefficients. 
 
6.1 Mean group estimator specification 
 
The dynamic model we use in this section is specified as follows: 
 
titiiititiiiiti LnKLnPLnQtLnQ ,
*
,111,
*
1,
* εβλϕγα +++++=
−
            (12) 
 
Equation 12 is the standard formulation of a dynamic heterogeneous panel model, consistent 
with Pesaran and Smith’s (1995) specification. However, with the consideration of saving 
degree of freedom, we include only one lag of the dependent variable on the right hand side of 
the function rather than adding lag one of all independent variables like the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) estimation used by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Pesaran (1997) and 
Pesaran and Smith (1999) argue that the use of the ARDL estimation procedure has advantages 
over the fully-modified (FM) OLS estimator designed by Philips and Hansen (PH) (1990) for 
time series co-integration relations, e.g. in that the tests based on PH method have a clear 
tendency to over-reject in small samples and also show larger bias. 
 
Based on the mean group estimation procedure, we ran regressions for each individual country, 
then averaged across countries using two methods to obtain the average long run coefficients.  
According to the first method, the long-run elasticities of LnQ* with respect to LnP and LnK* 
can be calculated using the formula, 
i
i
i
ϕ
λη ∧
∧
−
=
1
 and 
i
i
i
ϕ
βξ ∧
∧
−
=
1
respectively. iλ
∧
, 
iϕ
∧
 and iβ
∧
are the estimated values of the corresponding parameters in Equation (12). Then 
the average long-run coefficients in terms of LnP and LnK* can be computed as 
                                                        
6 For example, the pooled estimator assumes that the coefficients are homogeneous across sections, an 
assumption which we wish to ease here. 
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The second method, as presented by Pesaran and Smith (1995), maintains that the average 
long-run coefficients can also be calculated using the means of short-term coefficients, namely  
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The significance levels or t-values of iη  and iξ  were calculated by following the formulas, 
( )
i
i
t value
se
η
η
η
∧
∧− =  and 
( )
i
i i
t value
se
ξ
ξ
ξ
∧
∧− =  respectively, where the standard errors were 
computed as the square root of the variance of iη
∧
 and iξ
∧
 divided by the number of groups 
(Smith and Fuertes 2004).  
 
6.2 Empirical result 
 
Results for individual country coefficients with a time trend are given in Appendix 2, where we 
ran the regression in Equation 12 on 16 countries7 individually, i.e. 11 advanced OECD 
countries and 5 EMEs. The coefficients of LCPW and LPFAGDP measure the short-run effects 
on output, while these coefficients divided by one minus lag one of output LOPW(-1) measure 
the long run effects on output. Not surprisingly, results vary across countries. The general 
pattern, however, is clear. The impact of the capital per worker ratio is generally positive, in 15 
out of 16 estimates, indicating the positive impact of capital accumulation on output, and is 
significant in 7 cases. Regarding the pension assets/GDP ratio, 11 out of 16 estimates show a 
positive sign, although some are insignificant. Meanwhile, the long run effect of LCPW (the 
ratio of the coefficient on LCPW to one minus the coefficient on LOPW(-1)) is generally 
around 1, and the pension asset variable is usually around 0.1. The average short-run 
coefficients for all explanatory variables are given in the bottom-right corner of Appendix 2. A 
one per cent increase in pension assets leads to an immediate rise in output by 0.022 per cent, 
while capital’s contribution is larger at 0.283 per cent. The average lagged dependent variable 
is 0.718. 
 
Further justified in our approach by the differentials across countries as revealed in Appendix 2, 
we followed the approach noted above by Pesaran and Smith (1995) to assess the long run 
relation between output, pension assets and capital. Results, according to the mean-group 
estimators using Methods 1 and 2 are summarized in Tables 5a, 5b and 5c. As in Section 5, we 
ran three separate regressions by country groupings, i.e. all 16 countries, 11 OECD countries 
and 5 EMEs. Table 5a presents results for the ARDL with time trend, based on all 16 countries, 
while Table 5b is based on 10 countries, excluding Canada, Japan, Malaysia, South Africa, 
Sweden and Switzerland. We dropped those countries since most of coefficient estimates (at 
least 3 out of 4 estimates) for those countries are not significant (See Appendix 2 for details). 
Therefore, their presence might distort our results from the mean-group estimators. One of the 
                                                        
7 22 other countries were excluded due to the small number of observations. 
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reason pension assets ratios are insignificant in those countries might be the simple ARDL 
model we specified. However, in order to keep the specification consistent across countries, 
and to follow the methodology by Pesaran and Smith (1995), we retain it in this section. 
Finally in Table 5c we show corresponding results for all 16 countries without the time trend. 
 
Results in Table 5a are satisfactory and encouraging, as all estimates under the two methods 
and three groups are positive, indicating a positive average long run relationship between 
pension assets, capital stock and output. For example, for OECD countries, a one per cent 
increase in the capital stock raises output by 0.936 per cent under method 1 and 0.947 per cent 
under method 2. These two estimates are quite close to each other. In fact, it is this estimation 
robustness that leads us to use the simplified model compared with Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
 
Concerning the log of pension assets/GDP, we find that All countries and EMEs have highly 
significant coefficients, with the long run effect being around three times larger in EMEs than 
in the All country average. Note however, that this is strongly affected by the result for Chile, 
without which the EME result would be similar to that from DOLS set out in Section 5.2. 
Whereas the estimates for OECD countries under both methods in Table 5a are not significant, 
as noted above, some country by country results feature largely insignificant coefficients. In 
order to address this problem, we excluded those countries, and the subsequent results are 
presented in Table 5b. We still have the expected signs and all the LPFAGDP variables are now 
significant and positive. The effect is, unsurprisingly, larger for EMEs than OECD countries as 
well as than All countries. 
 
The third set of results in Table 5c are for the equations without the trend. Here we find that for 
all 16 countries, there is a significant and positive effect of LPFAGDP, thus supporting the 
result with trend. The coefficients are larger than with the time trend for OECD countries, but 
reflecting the result for Chile, they are smaller for All countries and EMEs. The EME 
coefficients are again consistently larger than for OECD countries. 
 
7. Co integration test 
 
As noted in Section 4, pension fund assets, capital per worker and output per worker are all I(1) 
variables, then we may be interested in whether they are co-integrated, i.e. whether there exists 
a long run relationship between them. We address this issue in this section on a 
country-by-country basis to allow for heterogeneity, as well as calculating panel estimates of 
the cointegrating coefficients. 
 
A co-integrating relationship captures the long run or equilibrium relationship between 
non-stationary, i.e. I(1) variables. If variables are non-stationary, particularly in the case of 
time series data, but the common residual terms are stationary, i.e. I(0), then we say these 
variables are co-integrated and economic theory as set out in Section 2 suggests forces which 
tend to keep such series together, and do not let them drift too far apart (Banerjee et al 1993). In 
addition, if variables are co-integrated, our estimates are super-consistent. In other words, our 
estimates are not only consistent, but also converge to their true values more quickly than 
normal (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  
 
7.1 Specification 
 
In this paper we employ the VAR-based cointegration test (Vector Error Correction Model) 
using the methodology developed by Johansen (1991 and 1995). The specification is as 
follows: 
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ty is a k-vector of I(1) variables, i.e. OPW, CPW and PFAGDP in this paper. L is the lag 
operator, and the lag order is selected based on a range of information criteria, i.e. AIC (Akaike 
information criterion) and SC (Schwarz information criterion). Generally, the suggested lag 
order is 2 years, although in some cases it extended to 3 years. If Equation (13) is written as 
VAR format, then we have  
 
tkttt yyLy ε+Π+∆Γ=∆ −−1)(                                       (14) 
 
where  
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whereα is the speed of adjustment from short run deviation to long run equilibrium, and 'β is 
the cointegrating vector, which thus represents the long run coefficients. Based on Granger’s 
representation theorem, the Johansen VAR-based cointegration test is to first estimate the 
Πmatrix from an unrestricted VAR and then test whether the restriction suggested by the 
reduced rank of Π - the number of cointegrating relations - is rejected.  
 
7.2 Results for Cointegration test 
 
This section presents the estimation results for the Johansen cointegration test. Again, we 
consider two slightly different specifications, i.e. one without a trend and the other with trend. 
We group our sample into OECD countries and EMEs, which in turn are estimated separately.  
 
Tables 6a and 6b give results of our first specification, i.e. without a trend. In most cases, the 
Trace and Maximum-Eigenvalue statistics indicate a co-integrating relationship between our 
variables, and the null hypothesis of non-cointegration is rejected at either the 5% or 10% level. 
Note that the signs of coefficients are opposite to those of the impact of the variable on LOPW 
because the equations are normalized in the form 0 = LOPW - a1LPFAGDP - a2LCPW 
 
As shown in Table 6a, in only two of eleven OECD countries, i.e. Canada and Switzerland is 
the sign of coefficients on LPFAGDP positive, implying a negative relationship between 
pension assets growth and economic output in the normalized cointegrating relation. For all the 
other countries, however, the sign is negative, as expected. For almost all of these countries, 
pension fund growth has a statistically significant and positive relationship with output per 
worker, the extent of which varies from 0.04 for Sweden to 0.27 for Germany. The small size 
of the positive effect in Sweden could also be due to the restriction of Swedish’s ATP scheme 
from equity investment and state management of the fund (Davis 2003). 
 
Regarding the other regressor, i.e. LCPW (capital per worker), our estimates are satisfactory, as 
all coefficients are negative, implying a positive linkage between economic output and the 
capital stock across OECD countries. In addition, the estimates of coefficients of LCPW are 
quite close to each other; for seven out of eleven countries, it is between 0.55-0.80, implying a 
comparable production function relationship among developed OECD countries. All estimates 
except in Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, are less than 1, consistent with our model in 
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Section 2, which suggests that the β -elasticity of aggregate output with respect to capital 
should not be greater than 1.  
 
Results for EMEs are given in Table 6b. All coefficient estimates for LPFAGDP except for 
Malaysia are negative. Therefore, a beneficial effect of pensions on growth is also found across 
EMEs. For example, for Chile, one per cent increase in pension assets can contribute to 
economic growth by 0.14 per cent; this complements findings by Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), who 
shows that 0.1-0.4 per cent of the 1.5 per cent increase in total factor productivity (TFP) in 
Chile in the 1980s and 1990s was attributed to pension reform. As for LCPW, one out of five 
countries, South Africa, shows an incorrect positive sign. For the other four countries, however, 
the sign is negative, consistent with our findings earlier. In other words, in these countries, 
growth in the capital/labour ratio accompanies a rise in economy wide productivity. 
 
Tables 7a and 7b show the comparable results for the cointegrating vector with trend. Virtually 
all of the Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue tests show cointegration. The results are broadly 
comparable; in Table 7a we have 8 out of 11 results showing a positive effect of LPFAGDP on 
output per capita, while for LCPW it is 9 out of 11. In Table 7b we have 3 out of 5 with a 
positive effect of pension fund assets on output per head, and in 4 out of 5 cases for LCPW. 
Note that as shown in Section 7.3 below for the impulse responses, even where the 
cointegrating vector has a “wrong” sign, the dynamics may be such as to generate a long-term 
positive effect of pension assets on output.  
 
As regards the trend, among eleven OECD countries, six show a negative coefficient, which 
implies (given normalization) that technological advances over time enhance economic growth. 
The same finding is obtained by McCoskey and Kao (1999), where six out of eight OECD 
countries are identified to have a positive and significant trend. Similar results are found for 
EMEs (Table 7b) where three out of five countries show significant trends enhancing economic 
growth. 
 
To complement our country-by-country analysis, we derived the panel co-integration 
coefficients in Table 8 by averaging the individual coefficients from the above individual 
regressions. The formula for panelβ is as follows:   
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panelβ  is the panel coefficient, iβ  the coefficient for individual countries, and n the number of 
countries concerned.  
 
T-values for the panel co-integration were calculated by following the formula,  
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, paneltβ  is the panel t-values, and itβ  the t-value for individual countries.  
 
Again, our sample countries are grouped into All, OECD countries and EMEs. When 
estimating OECD and EMEs, we consider two scenarios, i.e. Panel 1 and Panel 2. In Panel 1, 
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we include all countries, regardless of the signs of coefficients. T-ratios are given in brackets 
under the estimates of corresponding coefficients. In Panel 2, we utilise all coefficients of 
LPFAGDP that are negative, consistent with theory, excluding other countries. 
 
The key finding is that in all cases, the effect of pension funds in the production function is 
positive and significant. For the All estimation, as revealed in the first row of Table 8, the 
coefficient of LPFAGDP without trend is –0.056, while that of LCPW is –0.646; both are of 
reasonable magnitude, consistent with our expectation. When taking the equation with trend 
the pension asset variable is smaller at -0.031 but still highly significant. The LCPW term is 
much smaller with the time trend, reflecting some of the outlying individual country results.  
 
In Panel 1, where all estimates are included, for OECD countries, the LPFAGDP variable is 
smaller for OECD countries than for EMEs, with the former being -0.046 without trend and 
-0.004 with trend, while for EMEs the corresponding results are -0.076 and -0.090. These are 
consistent with the results from DOLS and Mean-Group estimation. LCPW is 0.2-0.8 except 
for OECD countries with trend where the variable is very small. The time trend is on average 
positive for EMEs but negative for OECD countries. 
 
In Panel 2 where we only consider those countries with expected-sign pension asset elasticities 
in individual regressions, the panel coefficients are naturally larger at around -0.11 for OECD 
countries and -0.2 for EMEs. The capital stock variables are of more reasonable size, being 
0.6-0.8 in each case. 
 
In all, our co-integration estimations in this section, split into without and with trends, support 
the positive and long run relationship between growth, pension assets, capital stock and 
technological advances. In addition, there is further evidence that the beneficial impact of 
pension growth on growth is higher in EMEs than in OECD countries.  
 
7.3 Impulse responses and variance decomposition 
 
We now move on to impulse response tests derived from the Vector-Error-Correction Model 
underlying the Johansen results. The underlying rationale behind impulse responses is that a 
shock to one variable not only directly affects the variable itself, but also is transmitted to all of 
other endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the VECM. In our example, it 
implies that pension fund assets can directly impact on output per worker, but it might also 
affect capital per worker, which in turn induces improvement on output. Results are based on 
the Pesaran and Shin (1998) generalised response approach. Technically, it constructs an 
orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering. The generalized 
impulse responses from an innovation to the j-th variable are derived by applying a variable 
specific Cholesky factor computed with the j-th variable at the top of the Cholesky ordering. It 
avoids the arbitrariness of the Cholesky ordering. 
 
We specify a 25-year window given that it is expected that pension fund assets have a 
relatively long-period effect on both LOPW and LCPW, and hence a shorter period, e.g. 10 
years might not be long enough to capture the long run effect of LPFAGDP. The results are 
summarized in Table 9. It can be seen that the results are virtually all positive over 5, 10 and 
25-year horizons. Among OECD countries, the exceptions are Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, small open economies, growth in which is more dependent on external factors. 
Also, pension funds in those countries tend to be defined benefit, which may reduce the 
beneficial effect on labour markets of pension funding. Only in Switzerland is the negative 
effect sizeable, however. With the trend we also find a negative effect for Brazil, which again is 
characterised by defined benefit funds. Note that in Malaysia, Germany and Canada, the 
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positive impact arises despite a negative implied effect of pension assets in the cointegrating 
vector, and the opposite for the Netherlands and Belgium. This illustrates that the dynamics of 
the VECM can be such as to offset the sign of the long run effect for protracted periods. 
 
Looking at the summary results at the bottom of the table, we see that, consistent with the 
various parameter estimates in sections 5, 6 and 7, there is on average a positive effect of 
pension fund growth on output per capita, and this is significantly larger in EMEs than in 
OECD countries, even when the three OECD countries with a negative effect are excluded. As 
regards time patterns, OECD country impulse responses tend to be smoother than those of 
EMEs. This may link to economic vulnerability, and greater sensitive to external factors, such 
as currency crises and policy shifts. 
 
Turning to variance decompositions (Table 10), we see that the variance of pension fund assets 
explains a considerable proportion of the variance of output per capita in many of the countries 
concerned. There is a considerably higher proportion explained in EMEs than in OECD 
countries, suggestive of a greater potential contribution pension reform can have on the wider 
economy in these countries. Furthermore, whereas inclusion of a time trend in the VECM 
reduces the contribution of pension assets both in OECD countries and EMEs, the reduction is 
proportionately much larger for the former (from around 10% to 5%) than in the latter (from 
30% to 25%). 
 
9. Conclusion  
 
Pension funds have been expanding and will continue such a trend in coming decades given 
the rapidly aging population and the transition from unfunded systems to funded systems such 
as the World Bank multi-pillar model. Research on the direct link between pension funds 
growth and economic growth, however, is quite scarce. In this paper, we first briefly reviewed 
the issue of whether and why pension assets and economic performance are correlated. In 
Section 2, a modified Cobb-Douglas production function was developed, where we included 
pension assets viewed as a shift factor. The underlying philosophy is that pension assets can 
affect economic growth indirectly via financial market development (Davis and Hu 2005; 
Walker and Lefort 2002), or by its economy-wide impact through corporate engagement (Clark 
and Hebb 2003; Davis 2002 and 2003) and giving rise to less labour market distortion 
following pension reforms (Disney 2003).  In Section 4, results from our panel unit root tests 
indicated that all of our data are non-stationary but become stationary after first differencing, 
i.e. they are all I(1) variables.  
 
We employed a variety of econometric techniques, all with certain advantages as well as 
disadvantages, to explore in the light of theory the existence and significance of the 
relationship between log of output per worker (dependent variable) and log capital per worker 
and log pension assets/GDP (independent variables). We included a trend in estimation, as well 
as showing results without trend, to capture other exogenous factors (such as structural reform 
and technical progress) that might affect the relationship between the capital/labour ratio and 
output per capita. As shown in the summary Table 11, pension assets/GDP were found to 
positively and significantly affect output in a variety of econometric specifications, 
consistently for both the OECD countries and EMEs, while as shown above, effects are 
consistently larger for EMEs than for OECD countries. 
 
In more detail, in Section 5 we used the dynamic OLS (DOLS) model to examine the 
relationship between these I(1) variables. Results are encouraging, as we found a beneficial 
impact from pension assets growth to the output in the long run, which was significant in 
virtually all cases as indicated in Tables 4a and 4b. The results were robust when we used two 
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different specifications, i.e. 1 lead/lag and 2 leads/lags and with and without trend. In Section 6, 
in view of cross sections’ heterogeneity, we used dynamic heterogeneous models (Pesaran and 
Smith 1995) with an ARDL specification to investigate the average long run relations. The 
mean group estimator suggested a long run positive correlation between pension fund assets 
and output, but the values of the coefficients estimated vary between two methods. In both 
DOLS (with trend) and consistently in Mean-Group estimation we found evidence that EMEs 
benefit more from pension fund growth than OECD countries. For example, in Table 4b 
(DOLS with 2 leads/lags and trend), the positive effect is 0.049 for EMEs, while it is 0.012 for 
OECD countries.  
 
In Section 7, by using the methodology developed by Johansen (1991 and 1995) we 
investigated whether our I(1) variables are co-integrated. As suggested by our theoretical 
model in Section 2, both pension assets and capital per worker in most cases are co-integrated 
with output per worker. In the last part of Section 7, we used impulse response and variance 
decomposition tests to provide some quantitative estimates as to how and to what extent a 
shock to pension assets can affect output per worker and capital per worker. Results from 
impulse responses tests indicated that for most countries, pension assets growth boosts both 
capital and output during the initial few years before following a gradual decline. With the 
exception of some small open economies with defined benefit funds, the effect of a rise in 
pension fund assets on economic growth is positive, validating our theoretical analysis in 
Section 2. Both impulse responses and variance decompositions show a larger impact or level 
of explanation of pension assets for EMEs. Consistent with this, the panel estimates calculated 
from individual VECM regressions show that the beneficial effect of pension assets growth on 
economic development is stronger for EMEs than OECD countries. 
 
The overall policy implication of this research favours pension funding as a response to the 
challenge of ageing, as it indeed appears to offer an additional benefit to the economy in terms 
of productive efficiency. That said, it should be cautioned that not all countries have the 
necessary administrative and organizational infrastructure to develop successful pension funds 
(Holzmann and Hinz 2005) so careful preparation is necessary before launching such a pension 
reform. 
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Table 1 Total assets of pension funds within 18 advanced OECD countries (as of 2000) 
 
 Country Name Total assets (US$ mn) As % of GDP As % of Total 
AUS Australia 188892.83 48.63 1.54 
AUT Austria 7300.00 3.87 0.06 
BEL Belgium 14400.00 5.74 0.12 
CAN Canada 310500.00 43.94 2.54 
CHE* Switzerland 268600.00 124.25 2.19 
DEU Germany 62200.00 3.33 0.51 
DNK Denmark 40100 23.05 0.33 
ESP** Spain 32806.00 5.85 0.27 
GBR** UK 1141830.72 79.87 9.33 
ISL Iceland 6700.00 78.91 0.05 
ITA Italy 48100.00 4.48 0.39 
JPN Japan 2893319.29 60.72 23.63 
NLD Netherlands 550935.92 149.09 4.50 
NOR** Norway 11300.00 7.36 0.09 
NZL*** New Zealand 615.00 0.69 0.01 
PRT Portugal 12400.00 11.70 0.10 
SWE Sweden 93922.37 41.01 0.77 
USA US 6559771.48 66.87 53.58 
 Total assets within OECD 
countries 12243693.61 42.19**** 100.00 
Source: See Section 3 for details. * 1998 data, ** 1999 data and ***2002 data. **** average of pension assets of GDP 
within OECD countries.  
Table 2: Total assets of pension funds within 29 EMEs (as of 2002) 
 
  Country Name Total assets (US$ mn) As % of GDP As % of Total 
ARG Argentina 11409 11.16 4.05 
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BGR Bulgaria 41.94 0.27 0.01 
BOL Bolivia 1144 14.9 0.41 
BRA Brazil 47656 10.53 16.92 
CHL Chile 35500 55.34 12.60 
COL Colombia 5482 6.67 1.95 
CRI Costa Rica 136 0.81 0.05 
DOM Dominican Republic 184.49 0.87 0.07 
ECU Ecuador 14.27 0.06 0.01 
FJI Fiji 846.95 45.11 0.30 
HND Honduras 3.28 0.05 0.00 
HUN Hungary 1835 2.79 0.65 
IDN Indonesia 278.21 0.05 0.10 
KAZ Kazakhstan 1432 5.92 0.51 
KOR* Korea 11500 2.49 4.08 
LKA* Sri Lanka 2697.99 16.55 0.96 
MEX Mexico 31748 4.98 11.27 
MYS Malaysia 53605.11 56.33 19.03 
PAK Pakistan 947.98 1.57 0.34 
PAN Panama 464 3.77 0.16 
PER Peru 4527 7.96 1.61 
PHL Philippines 3062.5 3.97 1.09 
POL Poland 6674 3.56 2.37 
RUS Russia 1612.7 0.47 0.57 
SGP Singapore 55526.98 63.85 19.71 
SLV Slovakia 1088 7.62 0.39 
UKR Ukraine 2.62 0.01 0.00 
URG Uruguay 893 7.25 0.32 
ZAF** South Africa 1423.63 0.01 0.51 
  Total assets within EMEs 281736.65 11.55*** 100.00 
Source: various sources, including OECD Institutional Investors (2003), Davis and Steil (2001) and national 
sources. See Section 3 for details. All data are converted into and measured at US Dollars, for the convenience of 
across-country comparison.  
* 2000 data. **, 1997 data, *** average of pension assets of GDP within EMEs.   
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Table 3. Panel unit root test (38 countries, 20EMEs+18OECD) 
Variable Level 1st difference 
2nd 
difference 
 IPS (2003) LLC (2002) Hadri (2000) IPS (2003) LLC (2002) Hadri (2000) Hadri (2000)
PFAGDP 9.37 9.21 20.76*** -14.86*** -18.42*** 2.70*** 1.24 
p-value 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 
OPW 8.09 3.11 26.30*** -21.99*** -22.07*** 5.22*** 0.88 
p-value 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 
CPW 12.10 4.49 24.28*** -4.11*** -2.08** 8.17*** -0.46 
p-value 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.68 
PFAGDP: Pension fund assets/GDP. OPW: Output per worker. CPW: Capital stock per worker. Panel unit root 
tests are based on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Hadri (2000). The null hypothesis 
of IPS and LLC is non-stationarity, while that of Hadri is stationarity. *** significance at 1%. ** significance at 
5%. 
 
Table 4a. Estimates from dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimations (1 lead and 1 lag). 
Dependent variable – LOPW (37 countries) 
Estimated by panel fixed effects GLS with cross section weights. 
 All  OECD  EMEs  
 No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend With trend 
time trend  0.008***  0.010***  0.006*** 
LPFAGDP 0.047*** 0.001 0.065*** 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 
LCPW 0.707*** 0.549*** 0.662*** 0.385*** 0.71*** 0.624*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.98 0.99 0.997 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.051 0.042 0.046 0.031 0.056 0.053 
OBS 570 570 383 383 187 187 
No. of countries 37 37 18 18 19 19 
Memo: LPFAGDP  
with SUR estimation   0.074*** 0.021***   
Key: LPFAGDP: log of Pension fund assets/GDP. LOPW: log of output per worker. LCPW: log of capital stock 
per worker. ***, significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. OBS, number of observations.  
 
Table 4b. Estimates from dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimations (2 leads and 2 lags). 
Dependent variable – LOPW (33 countries) 
Estimated by panel fixed effects GLS with cross section weights. 
 All  OECD  EMEs  
 No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend With trend 
time trend  0.008***  0.011***  0.005*** 
LPFAGDP 0.051*** -0.001 0.068*** 0.012** 0.058*** 0.049*** 
LCPW 0.704*** 0.542*** 0.650*** 0.375*** 0.713*** 0.653*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.982 0.991 0.998 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.048 0.04 0.043 0.029 0.053 0.05 
OBS 498 498 347 347 150 150 
No. of countries 33 33 18 18 15 15 
Memo: LPFAGDP  
with SUR estimation   0.078*** 0.016***   
Key: LPFAGDP: log of Pension fund assets/GDP. LOPW: log of output per worker. LCPW: log of capital stock 
per worker. ***, significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. OBS, number of observations.  
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Table 5a. Heterogeneous panel estimates of mean long run output per worker   
(LOPW) elasticities. (16 countries, 11OECD + 5EMEs), with trend.  
 Method 1*  Method 2*  
 LPFAGDP(η ) LCPW (ξ ) LPFAGDP(η ) LCPW(ξ ) 
All 0.120*** 1.025*** 0.08*** 1.0*** 
OECD 0.009 0.936*** 0.012 0.947*** 
EMEs 0.453*** 1.284*** 0.311*** 1.189*** 
Key: see Table 3. Method 1 is the average of long run elasticities across countries, while method 2 is long runs 
from means of short run elasticities. Both methods are based on Pesaran and Smith (1995), calculation of t values 
based on Smith and Fuertes (2004). See Section 6 in text for details.  
 
Table 5b. Heterogeneous panel estimates of mean long run output per worker   
(LOPW) elasticities. (10 countries, 7OECD + 3EMEs), with trend 
 Method 1*  Method 2*  
 LPFAGDP(η ) LCPW (ξ ) LPFAGDP(η ) LCPW(ξ ) 
All 0.204*** 1.083*** 0.11*** 1.01*** 
OECD 0.073*** 0.953*** 0.047*** 0.95*** 
EMEs 0.531* 1.38*** 0.32* 1.22*** 
Key: see Table 3. Method 1 is the average of long run elasticities across countries, while method 2 is long runs 
from means of short run elasticities. Both methods are based on Pesaran and Smith (1995) , calculation of t values 
based on Smith and Fuertes (2004). See Section 6 in text for details.  
 
Table 5c. Heterogeneous panel estimates of mean long run output per worker   
(LOPW) elasticities. (16 countries, 11OECD + 5EMEs), without trend 
 Method 1*  Method 2*  
 LPFAGDP(η ) LCPW (ξ ) LPFAGDP(η ) LCPW(ξ ) 
All 0.137*** 0.509*** 0.094*** 0.549*** 
OECD 0.129** 0.635*** 0.061** 0.724*** 
EMEs 0.189*** 0.087 0.167*** 0.167 
Key: see Table 3. Method 1 is the average of long run elasticities across countries, while method 2 is long runs 
from means of short run elasticities. Both methods are based on Pesaran and Smith (1995) , calculation of t values 
based on Smith and Fuertes (2004). See Section 6 in text for details.  
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Table 6a. Co-integrating coefficients vector without trend; normalised on LOPW.  
OECD countries 
 
 LOPW LPFAGDP LCPW Trace Max-Eigenvalue 
Australia 1 -0.23*** -0.02 36.49 25.02 
  [7.67] [0.16]   
Belgium 1 -0.005 -0.68*** 30.4 14.4 
  [0.17]  [6.42]    
Canada 1 0.29*** -1.25*** 43.3 26.2 
  [4.83]  [11.36]    
Denmark 1 -0.11*** -0.76*** 44.0 27.93 
  [13.16]  [17.18]    
Germany 1 -0.27*** -0.53*** 33.2 17.5 
  [11.33]  [4.56]    
Japan 1 -0.12*** -0.56*** 41.0 26.24 
  [7.22]  [16.62]    
Netherlands 1 -0.11**  -0.67***  27.42  23.51  
  [3.8]  [3.3]    
Sweden 1 -0.04* -1.21*** 30.02 25.24 
  [1.62]  [42.14]    
Switzerland 1 0.18*** -1.23*** 35.26 22.09 
  [3.60] [9.46]   
UK 1 -0.06*** -0.78*** 33.65 25.10 
  [12.49]  [39.13]    
USA 1 -0.04 -0.75*** 31.54 22.62 
  [1.49]  [17.47]    
Key: see Table 3. Co-integration estimation is based on Johansen methodology (1991 and 1995). T values are 
under estimates of corresponding coefficients. Lag length is selected based on a range of criteria statistics, e.g. 
AIC (Akaike information criterion) and SC (Schwarz information criterion). T-values are in square brackets. 
Under both Trace and Max-eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a co-integration relationship at 5% or 10% 
level; the only exceptions are Belgium and Germany under Max-eigenvalue statistics.  
 
Table 6b. Co-integrating coefficients vector without trend; normalised on LOPW. 
Emerging market economies (EMEs) 
 
 LOPW LPFAGDP LCPW Trace Max-Eigenvalue 
Brazil 1 -0.07*** -0.12 35.70 25.20 
  [13.20] [0.36]   
Chile 1 -0.14*** -0.48*** 49.60 34.80 
  [23.00] [35.82]   
Korea 1 -0.27*** -0.71*** 45.1 25.8 
  [5.88] [28.18]   
Malaysia 1 0.23 -0.8*** 35.4 24.9 
  [5.75] [26.67]   
South Africa 1 -0.14*** 0.19*** 105.6 60.9 
  [17.20] [-3.80]   
Key: see Table 3. Under both Trace and Max-Eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a co-integration 
relationship at 5% or 10% level.  
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Table 7a. Co-integrating coefficients vector with trend; normalised on LOPW; OECD 
countries 
 
 LOPW LPFAGDP LCPW Trend Trace Max-Eigenvalue 
Australia 1 -0.23*** -0.20 0.00 44.19 25.52 
  [7.67] [0.56] [0.30]   
Belgium 1 -0.02*** -0.03 -0.02*** 74.30 50.30 
  [6.05] [0.98] [27.68]   
Canada 1 0.26*** -0.67*** -0.01*** 27.02 20.39 
  [8.67]  [6.09]  [5.50]    
Denmark 1 -0.14*** -0.95*** 0.004 29.35 23.77 
  [4.39]  [8.04]  [-1.32]    
Germany 1 0.50*** 2.87*** -0.07*** 42.03 21.74 
  [-3.30]  [-2.96]  [4.57]    
Japan 1 -0.12*** -0.73*** 0.01 46.34 27.77 
  [5.79]  [5.40]  [-1.45]    
Netherlands 1 -0.14*  -0.72***  0.002  46.34  27.77  
  [1.66]  [3.16]  [-0.29]    
Sweden 1 -0.03 4.08*** -0.07*** 71.27 47.82 
  [0.65]  [-7.97]  [10.44]    
Switzerland 1 0.15*** -0.66** -0.017* 47.0 23.4 
  [3.42]  [2.46]  [1.66]    
UK 1 -0.16*** -1.69*** 0.025*** 28.20 20.83 
  [5.5]  [6.6]  [-3.8]    
USA 1 -0.11** -1.48*** -0.02* 42.01 23.14 
  [2.20] [3.08] [1.62]   
Key: see Table 3. Under both Trace and Max-eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a co-integration 
relationship at 5% or 10% level; the only exception is Germany under Max-eigenvalue statistics.  
Table 7b. Co- integrating coefficients vector with trend; normalised on LOPW; 
Emerging market economies (EMEs)  
 
 LOPW LPFAGDP LCPW Trend Trace Max-Eigenvalue 
Brazil 1 0.16*** 0.07*** -0.03*** 84.50 49.10 
  [20.33] [14.11] [-24.55]   
Chile 1 -0.31*** -0.70*** 0.04*** 65.20 41.70 
  [10.33] [10.00] [4.11]   
Korea 1 -0.40*** -0.95** 0.02 33.62 23.94 
  [4.15]  [2.37]  [-0.61]    
Malaysia 1 0.23*** -0.69*** -0.007*** 40.4 25.1 
  [-6.3]  [8.2]  [6.07]    
South 
Africa 1 -0.13*** -0.24*** -0.01*** 137.1 83.9 
  [29.89]  [5.59]  [10.92]    
Key: see Table 3. * Under both Trace and Max-eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a co-integration 
relationship at 5% or 10% level.  
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Table 8. Panel estimation of co-integrating coefficients normalized on LOPW 
Without trend With trend 
  LPFAGDP LCPW LPFAGDP LCPW T 
All OECD+EMEs -0.056*** -0.646*** -0.031*** -0.082*** -0.008*** 
  (21.6) (64.7) (6.2) (4.8) (18.7) 
Panel 1 OECD -0.046*** -0.766*** -0.004* -0.016*** -0.013*** 
  (14.9) (49.4) (1.9) (7.2) (12.9) 
 EMEs -0.076*** -0.382*** -0.090*** -0.226*** 0.005*** 
  (16.7) (42.4) (8.3) (2.1) (14.3) 
Panel 2 OECD -0.109*** -0.661*** -0.119*** -0.887*** -0.026*** 
  (19.2) (47.7) (7.8) (12.1) (17.4) 
 EMEs -0.153*** -0.662*** -0.280*** -0.630*** 0.018*** 
  (21.4) (42.4) (25.5) (10.4) (3.5) 
Key: see Table 3. Panel coefficients and t-values are calculated using individual estimates (see Text for details). 
Panel 1 includes all countries in relevant groups, while Panel 2 includes only those countries whereby estimates of 
coefficients are negative in individual normalized cointegrating equations.  
 
Table 9. Summary of impulse responses of output per worker to pension assets 
Percent response to one standard deviation change 
 Without trend With trend 
Years 5 10 25 5 10 25 
Australia 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.12 1.11 
Belgium -0.12 -0.13 -0.20 -0.04 0.09 0.05 
Canada 0.64 0.24 0.26 0.05 -0.06 -0.09 
Denmark 0.24 0.43 0.42 -0.10 0.39 0.33 
Germany 0.71 1.67 1.87 0.40 0.86 1.45 
Japan 1.24 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.76 0.79 
Netherlands -0.28 -0.31 -0.41 -0.32 -0.36 -0.47 
Sweden 1.23 1.05 1.05 0.56 1.31 0.84 
Switzerland -1.13 -0.98 -1.00 -1.13 -0.98 -1.00 
UK 0.25 0.46 0.43 0.23 0.61 0.55 
USA -0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.22 
Brazil 1.52 -0.21 0.48 -0.40 -0.45 -0.28 
Chile 1.26 2.38 1.80 3.71 5.23 2.66 
Korea 3.43 4.37 4.02 4.23 4.82 4.41 
Malaysia 2.45 0.69 0.63 1.93 0.43 0.25 
South Africa 4.10 3.82 3.87 4.01 4.15 4.28 
All 1.04 0.97 0.96 0.95 1.12 0.94 
OECD 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.16 0.34 0.34 
OECD 
positive 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.41 0.62 0.65 
EME 2.55 2.21 2.16 2.70 2.84 2.26 
Note: Based on Pesaran and Shin (1998) generalised response approach. See text for details 
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Table 10: Variance decomposition: pension fund assets on LOPW 
Percent Without trend With trend 
Years 5 10 25 5 10 25 
Australia 4.71 4.58 4.53 4.48 4.47 4.50 
Belgium 9.03 7.09 5.72 5.09 7.39 11.99 
Canada 8.07 5.00 2.53 1.91 1.72 0.88 
Denmark 5.47 8.14 11.95 2.38 4.13 7.79 
Germany 0.91 21.74 33.37 10.44 3.73 2.30 
Japan 5.74 5.04 4.35 4.09 3.75 3.58 
Netherlands 0.63 0.33 0.18 0.56 0.34 0.39 
Sweden 28.25 40.81 52.12 6.47 5.78 7.01 
Switzerland 3.70 2.43 1.32 3.79 2.49 1.36 
UK 11.60 16.35 24.54 7.74 9.75 13.60 
USA 19.41 9.34 4.12 15.47 7.25 4.17 
Brazil 8.79 8.80 12.22 2.80 2.59 1.91 
Chile 34.89 48.82 54.52 25.43 30.49 28.03 
Korea 26.48 22.66 20.99 29.49 25.56 23.90 
Malaysia 67.34 45.80 44.19 74.42 58.06 56.66 
South Africa 14.44 14.38 14.19 4.96 5.15 5.19 
All 15.59 16.33 18.18 12.47 10.79 10.83 
OECD 8.86 10.98 13.16 5.67 4.62 5.23 
EME 30.39 28.09 29.22 27.42 24.37 23.14 
 
Table 11. Summary of significant effects of log pension assets/GDP on LOPW 
 Method/specification All OECD EMEs 
DOLS    
1 lead/lag no trend + + + 
1 lead/lag with trend Ins + + 
2 lead/lag no trend + + + 
2 lead/lag with trend Ins + + 
Heterogeneous panel    
Method 1 all countries trend + Ins + 
Method 2 all countries trend + Ins + 
Method 1 subset trend + + + 
Method 2 subset trend + + + 
Method 1 all countries no trend + + + 
Method 2 all countries no trend + + + 
Johansen    
All without trend +   
All with trend +   
Panel 1 without trend  + + 
Panel 2 without trend  + + 
Panel 1 with trend  + + 
Panel 2 with trend  + + 
Note: Ins=insignificant 
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Appendix 1: Variable, data source and observation period. (20EMEs+18OECD) 
 
Country PFAGDP Data source OPW CPW Data source 
Argentina 1994-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Australia 1970-2003 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001), Reserve bank of 
Australia 1960-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Austria 1993-2000 OECD (2003) 1960-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Belgium 1981-1999 OECD (2003) 1960-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Bolivia 1997-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1965-2001 WDI (2003) 
Brazil 1984-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1970-2001 WDI (2003) 
Canada 1966-2000 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001) 1965-2002 1965-2001 WDI (2003) 
Chile 1981-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Colombia 1994-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Denmark 1966-1999 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001) 1960-2002 1966-2001 WDI (2003) 
Ecuador 1995-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1965-2001 WDI (2003) 
Fiji 1994-2003 National Provident Fund 1960-2002 N.A. WDI (2003) 
Germany 1966-2000 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001) 1971-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Hungary 1998-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2000 WDI (2003) 
Iceland 1980-2000 OECD (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Indonesia 1991-1996 Social Security Association 1960-2002 1979-2001 WDI (2003) 
Italy 1990-2000 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001) 1960-2002 1965-2001 WDI (2003) 
Japan 1969-2002 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001), Institute of Pension 
Research 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Korea 1980-2000 OECD (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2002 WDI (2003) 
Luxembourg 1985-1996 OECD (2003) 1960-2002 1965-2000 WDI (2003) 
Malaysia 1975-2003 Bank Negara Malaysia 1960-2002 1960-2002 WDI (2003) 
Mexico 1997-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Netherlands 1967-2001 
OECD(2003), Davis & 
Steil(2001) 1960-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Norway 1980-1999 OECD 2003) 1960-2002 1960-2000 WDI (2003) 
Panama 1998-2002 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1980-2002 WDI (2003) 
Peru 1993-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
Philippine 1985-2002 Social Security System 1960-2002 1960-2002 WDI (2003) 
Poland 1999-2003 FIAP (2003) 1990-2002 1990-2002 WDI (2003) 
Portugal 1989-2000 OECD (2003) 1960-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Singapore 1983-2003 Central Provident Fund 1960-2002 1965-2002 WDI (2003) 
South Africa 1980-1997 
South African Reserve Bank, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1999) 1960-2002 1960-2002 WDI (2003) 
Spain 1988-2003 OECD (2003), FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1971-2001 WDI (2003) 
Sri Lanka 1989-2000 
Employees and Provident 
Fund 1960-2002 1960-2002 WDI (2003) 
Sweden 1966-2000 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001) 1960-2002 1965-2001 WDI (2003) 
Switzerland 1970-1998 OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 1960-2002 1965-2001 WDI (2003) 
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(2001) 
UK 1964-2002 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001), National Financial 
Statistics (2003) 1960-2002 1970-2001 WDI (2003) 
Uruguay 1996-2003 FIAP (2003) 1960-2002 1960-2001 WDI (2003) 
USA 1966-2000 
OECD (2003), Davis & Steil 
(2001) 1960-2002 1960-2000 WDI (2003) 
PFAGDP: Pension fund assets/GDP. OPW: Output per worker. CPW: Capital stock per worker.  
References in Table: 
FIAP (2003): Federación Internacional de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (International Federation of 
Pension Fund Administrations) in Chile.  
OECD (2003): OECD Institutional Investors Database.  
Davis and Steil (2001): Institutional Investors, the MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999): Financial Structure and Economic Development Database. World 
Bank.  
WDI (2003): World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
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Appendix 2. Individual country (16) coefficients and average short-run coefficients. 
Dependent variable - LOPW 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Memo: 
long run 
effect Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Memo: 
long run 
effect 
Australia    Malaysia    
TREND -0.002 -1.244  TREND 0.003 0.515  
LOPW(-1) 0.374* 1.985  LOPW(-1) 0.854*** 4.523  
LCPW 0.593*** 3.360 0.946 LCPW 0.116 0.638 0.8 
LPFAGDP 0.027 1.540 0.043 LPFAGDP -0.103 -1.612 -0.7 
Belgium    Netherlands    
TREND 0.002* 1.907  TREND 0.008*** 3.543  
LOPW(-1) 0.820*** 3.185  LOPW(-1) 0.324 1.609  
LCPW 0.155 0.658 0.86 LCPW 0.604*** 3.333 0.89 
LPFAGDP -0.029 -1.476 -0.16 LPFAGDP -0.045** -2.208 -0.07 
Brazil    South Africa    
TREND -0.007 -1.292  TREND 0.002 0.492  
LOPW(-1) 0.640*** 3.100  LOPW(-1) 0.865*** 2.938  
LCPW 0.380** 2.098 1.06 LCPW 0.135 0.490 1.0 
LPFAGDP 0.074* 1.794 0.20 LPFAGDP 0.030 0.626 0.22 
Canada    Sweden    
TREND 0.000 0.016  TREND 0.000 0.070  
LOPW(-1) 0.912*** 5.866  LOPW(-1) 0.917*** 6.091  
LCPW 0.082 0.610 0.94 LCPW 0.080 0.565 0.97 
LPFAGDP -0.020 -0.292 -0.23 LPFAGDP 0.006 0.256 0.07 
Chile    Switzerland    
TREND -0.027*** -3.288  TREND -0.0029 -1.425  
LOPW(-1) 0.868*** 5.451  LOPW(-1) 0.776*** 4.198  
LCPW 0.259 1.473 1.97 LCPW 0.217 1.258  
LPFAGDP 0.168*** 3.713 1.28 LPFAGDP 0.034 0.682  
Denmark    U.K.    
TREND -0.003* -1.658  TREND -0.001 -1.082  
LOPW(-1) 0.671*** 3.409  LOPW(-1) 0.688*** 4.038  
LCPW 0.333* 1.744 1.01 LCPW 0.304* 1.876 0.97 
LPFAGDP 0.079* 1.940 0.24 LPFAGDP 0.030* 1.715 0.10 
Germany    USA    
TREND -0.001 -1.262  TREND -0.003* -1.770  
LOPW(-1) 0.767*** 9.701  LOPW(-1) 0.373** 2.160  
LCPW 0.241*** 3.140 1.04 LCPW 0.610*** 3.666 0.97 
LPFAGDP 0.066*** 3.115 0.28 LPFAGDP 0.010 0.406 0.02 
Japan        
TREND 0.000 0.050      
LOPW(-1) 1.026*** 6.031      
LCPW -0.024 -0.150 0.90     
LPFAGDP -0.010 -0.882 0.38     
Korea    Average    
TREND -0.016* -1.746  TREND -0.003*** -18.353  
LOPW(-1) 0.615** 2.183  LOPW(-1) 0.718*** 218.667  
LCPW 0.429 1.491 1.11 LCPW 0.283*** 88.528 1.02 
LPFAGDP 0.043 1.193 0.11 LPFAGDP 0.022*** 20.457 0.12 
Key: see Table 3a.  Average is the average short-run coefficient, rather than the long-run coefficient.  
Calculation of average “t” values is from Smith and Fuertes (2004)  
